Pogresno, nije problem u moralu nego sistemu. Sama sustina kapitalizma je stekni sto vise, ako ne napredujes propadas. Kao sto je Kejnzi rekao kapitalizam je sistem u kojem od najogavnijih ljudi, vodjenih najogavnijim motivima ocekujemo da ucine nesto dobro za zajednicu.
Nacionalne drzave su prevazidjene, svaki dan gledamo nove integracije drzava od EU do ASEANa, trziste a samim tim i kapital je globalan,ako nesto nemoze u jednoj drzavi za cas ode u drugu. Vreme se ne moze vratiti.
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četvrtak, 25 februar 2010 23:27
Slobodan
"...pitanje je da li je kraj neoliberalizma i kraj ideje o samoregulišućem laissez-faire tržištu ili će se ova ideja pojaviti u nekoj novoj inkarnaciji ..." Nažalost, mislim da nema sumnje da se duh neće sam vratiti u bocu.
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petak, 26 februar 2010 00:42
Petrushin
U dobra Sokratesa su se raspravljali da li je odnos nagradjivanja/zarada 4:1 pravedan ili ne!
U Kapitalizmu je, na danasnji dan, dostigao cifru od 500:1 i dalje je u uzlaznoj putanji.
1960-tih godina je 30% stanovnistva je imalo u posjedu 80% svetskog bogatstva, da bi na danasnji dan svega JEDAN ODSTO STANOVNISTVA imalo vise nego ostalih 90%:
Jedan odsto (1%) stanovnistva raspolaze sa skoro 90% svetskog bogatstva - i trend je rastuci.
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petak, 26 februar 2010 04:06
Jovan
"Stara asketska burzoazija"!? Nije mi poznato odakle potice ovaj termin kao i odakle bi mogao da bude srocen u eufemistickom smislu. Nigde nisam naisao ni na primer o stvaranju bogatsva nekog ko je stednjom i vrednim radom kako je receno stvorio to bogatsvo, mozda treba relativizovati sta se tu misli pod bogatsvom. Nasuprot, bilo kakvo i letimicno izucavanje istorije (cak i ove koloko je moglo da se istera frizirane) namernika istrazitelja navodi na zakljucak da je svetsko bogatsvo stvarano na jednoj strani, uvek bilo bazirano na placki na drugoj. Od Egipta u kome su robovi robovali, rimskog razavlacenja blaga iz celog sveta u zidine grada na sedam brzuljaka, pa engleskog plackanja okolo naokolo do Indije (oni to vole da zovu sirenje engleske kulture), pa redom do modernih propagatora demokratije bazirane na monopolu na naftu... itd. Uvid u bigrafiju danasnjih "najuglednijih" porodica sa druge strane atlantika daje podatke da su svi oni pocinjali trgovinom robova, prelazili na trgovinu opijumom i na kraju zavrsavali u finansijskom sektoru legalizujuci svoje bogatstvo, asketski. Ne znam samo sto napase ovog Sarica, Covek nista razlicito od njih nije radio, samo je izgleda dobro proucio istoriju. Naravno da niko to ne zeli da prizna, sta vise kao svaki pljackas radi na dome da se sve to zataska i ne pominje (nedge sam cuo da je prevazidjeno bavljenje prosloscu), jer bi tada Srbija na listi genocida pala na utesno 78 mesto a mnogi danasnji koncepti bi morali da se temeljno menjaju. U nekom vremenu provedenom u Italiji, jedan prijatelj italijan, vozeci se autostradom pohvalio "Italija je i u starim vremenima imala najbolje puteve" na moj komentar "da, kad ste iz celog sveta dovlacili robove da vam grade puteve" nije progovorio ni rec. Ostali smo prijatelji jer smo se i druzili zato sto nam je istina, istrazivanje istine, suocavanje sa istinom i bilo najveca inspiracija i motiv prijateljstva.
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petak, 26 februar 2010 12:57
zvezdarac
Dekadencija "elite" je oduvek postojala. Specifičnost današnjice je ogroman napredak tehnologije, zbog čega se u visokorazvijenim zemljama javlja dekadencija naroda. S obzirom da nas istorija uči da je dekadencija put u propast, može se zaključiti da budućnost pripada narodima koji, i pored posedovanja tehnologije, još uvek žive asketski. A to su narodi Azije.
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petak, 26 februar 2010 15:45
thinking maize
Vrlo, vrlo inspirativan tekst! Mada, što se tiče citata ("Jučerašnji svet" Štefana Cvajga), mogli bi da se upitamo, a zašto otac g-dina Cvajga otvori svoju malu radnju BAŠ U SEVERNOJ ČEŠKOJ, a ne, recimo, u Beču, Salcburgu, Insbruku? Pored toga, ima još mnooogo ovakvih primera! Što se tiče nas pravoslavaca, neprevaziđeni su "Saveti" poznatog vizantijskog generala Katakalona Kekavmena (11-ti vek), zatim "Sovjeti zdravago razuma" našeg Dositeja Obradovića! Tu je pseudo-istorijsko
"delo" "Najbogatiji čovek Vavilona" u kome jedan od američkih gurua "asketskog kapitalizma" (ekonomski pandan Dejla Karnegija) ponavlja upravo reči g-dina Cvajga! Kao što vidite, sve to stoji kao u tekstu Š. Cvajga, kao i mnogo, mnogo ranije, ali pitanje je, da li kapitalizam, potican POHLEPOM I SAMO POHLEPOM, može da se reformiše ili MORA DA SE SRUŠI?! Komunisti odgovaraju sa DA imajući u vidu drugo rešenje. Široka struja političko-ekonomskog mišljenja, počev od socijal-demokrata, pa do fašista, zalaže se za drugo rešenje, ali, DA LI POSTOJI NEŠTO TREĆE?! Da li je moguće: DAJTE CESARU CESAREVO, A BOGU BOŽJE?
Da li je moguće: NE BOJTE SE ONOGA ŠTO ĆE VAM POGUBITI TELO, VEĆ SE BOJTE ONOGA, ŠTO ĆE VAM POGUBITI DUŠU! NE MOŽETE SLUŽITI DVOJICI GOSPODARA!
NE MOŽETE SLUŽITI I BOGU I MAMONU!Da li je to moguće? U svakom slučaju NEMA LAKIH REŠENjA!
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petak, 26 februar 2010 16:02
Antiglobalista
Ali neoliberalizam je faza u razvoju kapitalizma. Sistem je ušao u tu fazu jer je to neminovnost koju diktira LOGIKA KAPITALA. Tu logiku je moguće neko vreme suzbijati (kao što je to bio slučaj sa periodom socijaldemokratskog modela u Z. Evropi)ali pre ili kasnije ona postaje univerzalna.Prema tome, i nedostatak etike o kome govori prof. Dušanić je upravo posledica univerzalizacije te logike, odnosno logike profita,i njenog širenja na sve oblasti ljudskog života - počev od zdravstva i školstva do odnosa u porodici.
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subota, 27 februar 2010 17:08
Petrushin
Profesor Dusanic, kao i vecina pedagoga, gleda previse romanticarski na "dobra stara vremena", zaboravljajuci pri tome, da je sve sto prodje uvijek ljepse od "surove stvarnosti"; ne zato sto su vremena bila bolja, nego zato sto ljudsko bice uvijek idealizuje nesto o cemu ne zna mnogo "iz prve ruke", ili vec, naivno prihvata necija subjektivna shvatanja, kao relanost.
Da je profesor kojim slucaje citirao Engelsa ili Marksa o polozaju radnicke klase u 19. vijeku, siguran sam da bi zakljucak ovoga teksta bio mnogo radikalniji:
The hundreds of thousands of all classes and ranks crowding past each other, are they not all human beings with the same qualities and powers, and with the same interest in being happy? And have they not, in the end, to seek happiness in the same way, by the same means? And still they crowd by one another as though they had nothing in common, nothing to do with one another, and their only agreement is the tacit one, that each keep to his own side of the pavement, so as not to delay the opposing streams of the crowd, while it occurs to no man to honour another with so much as a glance. The brutal indifference, the unfeeling isolation of each in his private interest, becomes the more repellent and offensive, the more these individuals are crowded together, within a limited space. And, however much one may be aware that this isolation of the individual, this narrow self-seeking, is the fundamental principle of our society everywhere, it is nowhere so shamelessly barefaced, so self-conscious as just here in the crowding of the great city. The dissolution of mankind into monads, of which each one has a separate principle, the world of atoms, is here carried out to its utmost extreme.
Hence it comes, too, that the social war, the war of each against all, is here openly declared ... Just as in Stirner's recent book, people regard each other only as useful objects...
Condition of the Working Class in England - F. Engels, 1845
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subota, 27 februar 2010 17:21
Petrushin
Just targeting symptoms of the crisis is too neat by John Plender
/.../
As Andrew Haldane* of the Bank of England has pointed out, bank profits ceased in the mid-1980s to be boring as the banks appeared to have discovered a money machine. While the return on assets, which reflects management skill in extracting profits from a pool of assets, was mediocre, the return on equity, powered by luck and leverage, soared. At the same time, larger polygamous financial institutions were allowed by the Basel capital regime to run with lower capital buffers than their smaller monogamous partners. Now this bias in favour of size has been made worse by crisis-induced mergers. We are left with a financial system in which over-leveraged banking behemoths operate as an off-balance sheet adjunct of the public sector, while nurturing many profit centres that are increasingly oligopolistic. In wholesale finance, super-profits are generated by a handful of big operators in opaque over the counter markets. In retail finance, there are numerous areas where oligopoly and customer inertia underpin excess profits.
It follows that bankers in the boom were being paid bonuses not for brilliance but for excessive risk taking via leverage and for oligopolistic super-profits. Now they have been offered a state safety net and a steep yield curve, whereby they borrow at low cost to invest in higher yielding assets. This guarantees easy, low-risk profits, on which they nonetheless expect bonuses.
U ovom ispod tekstu cete vidjeti da je "drzava" itekako aktivna u odrzavanju postojeceg LUDILA - stampanjem svjezeg novca bez pokrica (quantitative easing), koji sa svim ostalim subvencijama, na danasnji dan, prelazi 13 triliona dolara na globallnom nivou (citav jedan U.S. BDP)
----------------
*Banking on the state - Andrew G Haldane
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subota, 27 februar 2010 17:36
Petrushin
Banking on the state - Andrew G Haldane
/.../
Out-of-the-money options: The payoffs to high-risk lending can be replicated using an alternative strategy of writing deep out-of-the-money options. This can be achieved, for example, by selling protection in the CDS market. The writer of that protection receives an insurance premium and thus a steady source of income in good states of the world. Because of that, this strategy appears to generate “alpha” – excess returns – during the good times.
In fact, this strategy is a wolf wrapped in sheep’s clothing; it is beta dressed up as alpha. In the event of a bad state of the world – default by the reference entity in a CDS context – the writers of the insurance suffer a significantly negative payoff, eliminating the apparent alpha earned in good states (Figure 3). This was, in effect, the AIG strategy. AIG is believed to have written around $1.0 trillion of CDS protection. This strategy delivered large apparent “alpha” returns during the disco years. But when the music ceased and true beta was revealed, AIG required state support of around $180bn.
/.../
The “St Petersburg paradox” explains how a gambling strategy which starts small but then doubles-up in the event of a loss can yield positive (indeed, potentially infinite) expected returns. Provided, that is, the gambler has the resources to double-up in the face of a losing streak. The St Petersburg lottery has many similarities with the game played between the state and the banks over the past century or so. The banks have repeatedly doubled-up. And the state has underwritten any losing streak. Clearer practical examples of a policy time-consistency problem are unlikely to exist.
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subota, 27 februar 2010 18:16
Petrushin
Glavni razlog STVARANJU finansijskih kriza, uvijek treba traziti u problemima kroz koje prolaze razvijene ekonomije - prvenstveno one, cija valuta se koristi u svjetskoj razmjeni.
Stednja u razvijenim zemljama je na istorijski niskom nivou; zaduzivanja na istorijski visokom nivou; akumulacija privrednog kapitala je takodje na niskom nivou. "Kriza" je oporezovala ustede zemalja u razvoju:
US capital productivity decline must be reversed
/.../
The biggest problem the US is facing is the productivity of capital. After the end of the second world war it took less than $2 of investment by government, corporations and individuals to produce $1 of GDP growth. The productivity of capital continued to be impressive until 1980 when Europe had recovered and Japan was producing cars and consumer electronics products that found wide acceptance in world markets.
In the single decade of the 1980s, the productivity of capital declined from a level where it took less than $2 of investment to produce $1 of growth to one where about $3 was needed. If you assign a 30 per cent gross margin to that revenue growth, the return on investment declined from 15 per cent to 10 per cent.
That level of return proved to be satisfactory, but in the first decade of the current century capital productivity declined seriously in the US. Because of profligate spending on over-priced housing and other assets that declined seriously, as well as deficit spending by the government, by the end of the decade it took $6 of capital to produce $1 of growth. The return on that would only be 5 per cent and few would put money at risk for that reward.
When you look abroad to assess our competitive position, the results are not encouraging. It is hard to put together comparable information but, based on the data I could gather, Europe was still getting $1 of growth for $2 of investment and China was getting at least $1 of growth for each dollar of investment.
FT.COM
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nedelja, 28 februar 2010 01:23
Trkulja Tomislav
Čini mi se da je danas moderno, svetski prozivati kapitalizam za sva zla ovoga sveta ali ako je tako, zašto su onda desetine miliona ljudi proteklih vekova, a i danas to čine, pošto poto želele da stignu do Amerike. Nije mi poznato da se slična stvar dešavala u slučaju Rusije bilo carske ili komunističke. Treba biti pošten i spoznati istinu da je upravo kapitalizam uspeo da raširi visoki standard, produžetak života na široke slojeve stanovništva. Sistem škripi, jer ekonomske zakonitosti i zakonitosti života se ne poštuju. Zbog toga je propao komunizam zbog toga propada S.A.D. Kapitalizam bez moralnih načela postaje čudovišan sistem i plašim se da dolazi vreme nekih suludih mesija sa "velikim idejama" koje će nas koštati mnogih glava, po pravilu onih najboljih. Nisam siguran da ću pravilno citirati Marksovu misao kada je rekao da se istorija jednom desi kao tragedija a drugi put kao farsa, ali čini mi se da idemo u susret nekoj farsi.
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Nacionalne drzave su prevazidjene, svaki dan gledamo nove integracije drzava od EU do ASEANa, trziste a samim tim i kapital je globalan,ako nesto nemoze u jednoj drzavi za cas ode u drugu. Vreme se ne moze vratiti.
U Kapitalizmu je, na danasnji dan, dostigao cifru od 500:1 i dalje je u uzlaznoj putanji.
1960-tih godina je 30% stanovnistva je imalo u posjedu 80% svetskog bogatstva, da bi na danasnji dan svega JEDAN ODSTO STANOVNISTVA imalo vise nego ostalih 90%:
Jedan odsto (1%) stanovnistva raspolaze sa skoro 90% svetskog bogatstva - i trend je rastuci.
"delo" "Najbogatiji čovek Vavilona" u kome jedan od američkih gurua "asketskog kapitalizma" (ekonomski pandan Dejla Karnegija) ponavlja upravo reči g-dina Cvajga! Kao što vidite, sve to stoji kao u tekstu Š. Cvajga, kao i mnogo, mnogo ranije, ali pitanje je, da li kapitalizam, potican POHLEPOM I SAMO POHLEPOM, može da se reformiše ili MORA DA SE SRUŠI?! Komunisti odgovaraju sa DA imajući u vidu drugo rešenje. Široka struja političko-ekonomskog mišljenja, počev od socijal-demokrata, pa do fašista, zalaže se za drugo rešenje, ali, DA LI POSTOJI NEŠTO TREĆE?! Da li je moguće: DAJTE CESARU CESAREVO, A BOGU BOŽJE?
Da li je moguće: NE BOJTE SE ONOGA ŠTO ĆE VAM POGUBITI TELO, VEĆ SE BOJTE ONOGA, ŠTO ĆE VAM POGUBITI DUŠU! NE MOŽETE SLUŽITI DVOJICI GOSPODARA!
NE MOŽETE SLUŽITI I BOGU I MAMONU! Da li je to moguće? U svakom slučaju NEMA LAKIH REŠENjA!
Da je profesor kojim slucaje citirao Engelsa ili Marksa o polozaju radnicke klase u 19. vijeku, siguran sam da bi zakljucak ovoga teksta bio mnogo radikalniji:
Hence it comes, too, that the social war, the war of each against all, is here openly declared ... Just as in Stirner's recent book, people regard each other only as useful objects...
Condition of the Working Class in England - F. Engels, 1845
/.../
As Andrew Haldane* of the Bank of England has pointed out, bank profits ceased in the mid-1980s to be boring as the banks appeared to have discovered a money machine. While the return on assets, which reflects management skill in extracting profits from a pool of assets, was mediocre, the return on equity, powered by luck and leverage, soared. At the same time, larger polygamous financial institutions were allowed by the Basel capital regime to run with lower capital buffers than their smaller monogamous partners. Now this bias in favour of size has been made worse by crisis-induced mergers. We are left with a financial system in which over-leveraged banking behemoths operate as an off-balance sheet adjunct of the public sector, while nurturing many profit centres that are increasingly oligopolistic. In wholesale finance, super-profits are generated by a handful of big operators in opaque over the counter markets. In retail finance, there are numerous areas where oligopoly and customer inertia underpin excess profits.
It follows that bankers in the boom were being paid bonuses not for brilliance but for excessive risk taking via leverage and for oligopolistic super-profits. Now they have been offered a state safety net and a steep yield curve, whereby they borrow at low cost to invest in higher yielding assets. This guarantees easy, low-risk profits, on which they nonetheless expect bonuses.
U ovom ispod tekstu cete vidjeti da je "drzava" itekako aktivna u odrzavanju postojeceg LUDILA - stampanjem svjezeg novca bez pokrica (quantitative easing), koji sa svim ostalim subvencijama, na danasnji dan, prelazi 13 triliona dolara na globallnom nivou (citav jedan U.S. BDP)
----------------
*Banking on the state - Andrew G Haldane
/.../
Out-of-the-money options: The payoffs to high-risk lending can be replicated using an alternative strategy of writing deep out-of-the-money options. This can be achieved, for example, by selling protection in the CDS market. The writer of that protection receives an insurance premium and thus a steady source of income in good states of the world. Because of that, this strategy appears to generate “alpha” – excess returns – during the good times.
In fact, this strategy is a wolf wrapped in sheep’s clothing; it is beta dressed up as alpha. In the event of a bad state of the world – default by the reference entity in a CDS context – the writers of the insurance suffer a significantly negative payoff, eliminating the apparent alpha earned in good states (Figure 3). This was, in effect, the AIG strategy. AIG is believed to have written around $1.0 trillion of CDS protection. This strategy delivered large apparent “alpha” returns during the disco years. But when the music ceased and true beta was revealed, AIG required state support of around $180bn.
/.../
The “St Petersburg paradox” explains how a gambling strategy which starts small but then doubles-up in the event of a loss can yield positive (indeed, potentially infinite) expected returns. Provided, that is, the gambler has the resources to double-up in the face of a losing streak. The St Petersburg lottery has many similarities with the game played between the state and the banks over the past century or so. The banks have repeatedly doubled-up. And the state has underwritten any losing streak. Clearer practical examples of a policy time-consistency problem are unlikely to exist.
Stednja u razvijenim zemljama je na istorijski niskom nivou; zaduzivanja na istorijski visokom nivou; akumulacija privrednog kapitala je takodje na niskom nivou. "Kriza" je oporezovala ustede zemalja u razvoju:
US capital productivity decline must be reversed
/.../
The biggest problem the US is facing is the productivity of capital. After the end of the second world war it took less than $2 of investment by government, corporations and individuals to produce $1 of GDP growth. The productivity of capital continued to be impressive until 1980 when Europe had recovered and Japan was producing cars and consumer electronics products that found wide acceptance in world markets.
In the single decade of the 1980s, the productivity of capital declined from a level where it took less than $2 of investment to produce $1 of growth to one where about $3 was needed. If you assign a 30 per cent gross margin to that revenue growth, the return on investment declined from 15 per cent to 10 per cent.
That level of return proved to be satisfactory, but in the first decade of the current century capital productivity declined seriously in the US. Because of profligate spending on over-priced housing and other assets that declined seriously, as well as deficit spending by the government, by the end of the decade it took $6 of capital to produce $1 of growth. The return on that would only be 5 per cent and few would put money at risk for that reward.
When you look abroad to assess our competitive position, the results are not encouraging. It is hard to put together comparable information but, based on the data I could gather, Europe was still getting $1 of growth for $2 of investment and China was getting at least $1 of growth for each dollar of investment.
FT.COM